State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 5, 2007 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
11-5-2007 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from November 5, 2007 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 
5, 2007 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/605 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 106, 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-26595 
- and -
MANHATTAN and BRONX SURFACE 
TRANSIT OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
COLLERAN, O'HARA & MILLS, LLP (EDWARD J. GROARKE, of counsel), 
for Charging Party < 
MARTIN SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (FRANCINE E. MENAKER, of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Transport Workers 
Union, Local 106, Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)1 dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that 
the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA) violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when MABSTOA 
unilaterally assigned Nicholas Palmiotti, a TSO bargaining member employed as a 
Transit Property Protection Supervisor (TPPS), to perform security camera work beyond 
the inherent scope of TPPS job duties and at locations within the New York City subway 
system under the jurisdiction of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA). The 
1
 40 PERB U4535 (2007). 
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charge also alleges that the assignment of Palmiotti adversely impacted other TSO 
members by requiring involuntary overtime. 
MABSTOA denied that it violated the Act and raised various affirmative defenses 
including res judicata and timeliness. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ found the improper practice charge was barred by res 
judicata based on the dismissal by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director), of an earlier improper practice charge filed by TSO, Case No. 
U-26513, pursuant to §204.1(a) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules). In the alternative, the 
ALJ concluded that TSO had failed to demonstrate that the assignment of Palmiotti 
violated the Act based on the following: a) although MABSTOA and NYCTA are separate 
employers, they are functionally integrated in the management and supervision of their 
respective employees; b) deployment of staff, including the assignment of an employee to 
perform work for another employer, constitutes a managerial prerogative under the Act; c) 
the duties assigned to Palmiotti were inherent duties of the TPPS position; d) the 
management rights clause of the collectively negotiated agreement between MABSTOA 
and TSO constitutes a waiver of the duty to bargain regarding assignments; and e) while 
the issue of an alleged increase in involuntary overtime may trigger an enforceable 
demand to negotiate its impact, TSO did not make a demand for impact negotiations. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the TSO argues that the ALJ erred in applying res judicata to 
the dismissal by the Director of its earlier improper practice charge, as amended. In 
addition, it contends that the ALJ's alternative conclusion, that MABSTOA did not violate 
the Act when it unilaterally assigned Palmiotti to the at-issue duties, was in error. 
MABSTOA supports the ALJ's conclusions. 
Case No. U-26595 -3-
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's dismissal of the charge based on the doctrine of res 
judicata but affirm, in part, the ALJ's alternative merit-based conclusion that MABSTOA 
did not violate the Act when it assigned Palmiotti to the duties at issue. 
Procedural Background 
On January 20, 2006, TSO filed an improper practice charge, Case No. U-26513, 
alleging that MABSTOA had violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally assigned 
Palmiotti to help install and program security cameras on various days in NYCTA's 
subway system. The charge alleged that on January 5, 2006, TSO's President Robert 
Romaine wrote to NYCTA's Director of Labor Relations Ralph Agritelley objecting to 
Palmiotti's unilateral assignment on the grounds that Palmiotti was performing work for 
a different employer, NYCTA, and that the work was not within the TPPS job 
description. The charge further alleged that Palmiotti's assignment adversely impacted 
others within the TSO bargaining unit by requiring them to perform Palmiotti's work in 
his absence. 
Consistent with §204.1(a) of the Rules, the Director engaged in an initial 
processing of TSO's charge by conducting a facial examination of the allegation. On 
January 25, 2006, the Director sent TSO a letter stating that the charge would not be 
processed due to deficiencies outlined in an attached deficiency notice.2 The Director's 
notice identified three specific reasons for the pleading's deficiency: it did not allege that 
^ A l * k „ . , « u 4.u~ - ~ - , j u~.c~.-~ J.I A I i : ,i i j-i r v t. >_ i_ix ,j._j.: 4.U_J. i u . _u< _. 
/-Miiiuuyn mc i coum utsiuic nic /AI_J inoiuues me uneuiu i s> leuei aicuiny uicu me u i id iye 
was deficient, it does not contain the notice attached to the letter identifying the 
Director's stated reasons for the deficiency. In addition, the record does not include the 
amended charge TSO filed in response to the deficiency notice. For purposes of 
determining TSO's exceptions, the Board has taken administrative notice of the 
Director's articulated reasons contained in the deficiency notice as well as the 
allegations in TSO's amended charge. 
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the duties assigned were not inherently part of Palmiotti's job duties or a related 
incidental task; the charge failed to allege that the increased workload to other 
bargaining unit members was substantial and that MABSTOA requires that the work be 
performed in the same amount of time; and TSO did not specify the names of the 
individuals involved or the time when the assignment was made. 
On February 7, 2006, MABSTOA filed an amended charge responsive to the 
Director's deficiency notice. The amended charge alleged, inter alia, that the installation 
and programming of security cameras were not an inherent part of TPPS job duties or 
related incidental tasks and that NYCTA general superintendent Joseph Corsello had 
assigned Palmiotti to perform those duties since on or about late August 2005. The 
amended charge did not allege when or how TSO first learned of Palmiotti's assignment. 
Following the Director's facial examination of the amended pleading, he 
concluded that the allegations did not set forth facts demonstrating that the charge, as 
amended, was timely pursuant to §204.1 (a) of the Rules because it alleged that the at-
issue assignment began in late August 2005. On February 15, 2006, the Director issued 
a decision dismissing the amended charge.3 Prior to dismissing the amended charge, 
the Director did not provide TSO with a second opportunity to amend the charge. 
On March 1, 2006, TSO filed the present charge containing, the identical 
allegations of the earlier dismissed amended charge but adding one additional 
allegation: TSO became aware of Palmiotti's assignment on November 8, 2005 during a 
meeting with NYSTA general superintendent Joseph Corsello. 
in a cover ietter to the Director enclosing the new charge, TSO's counsel stated: 
In light of the recent dismissal in Case No. U-26513,1 would 
appreciate it if you could process this charge at your earliest 
3
 Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth, 39 PERB fl4528 (2006). 
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convenience so I could avoid the necessity of filing 
exceptions with the Board. I would greatly appreciate it if 
your office could inform me whether this charge would (sic) 
be processed by March 8th so that I would have time to draft. 
and filed (sic) exceptions, if required. 
The Director processed the new charge and TSO did not file exceptions to the 
dismissal of the earlier amended charge. On March 8, 2006, the Director scheduled a 
pre-hearing conference to take place before an ALJ with respect to the new charge. In 
its answer, MABSTOA asserted both res judicata and timeliness as affirmative 
defenses. Subsequently, MABSTOA withdrew its timeliness defense. 
Prior to the hearing before the ALJ, MABSTOA requested the opportunity to file a 
motion to dismiss on grounds of res judicata based on the Director's deficiency 
dismissal of the earlier amended charge. In response, TSO stated that it was prepared 
to offer evidence during the hearing establishing that it first learned of Palmiotti's 
assignment within four months prior to filing the charge. The ALJ deferred ruling on the 
res judicata issue until the close of the record and after the issue was briefed by the 
parties. Without objection, evidence was presented during the hearing regarding the 
time and circumstances when TSO learned of Palmiotti's assignment. 
Facts 
MABSTOA is a public benefit corporation responsible for operating certain 
omnibus lines formerly owned and operated by two companies which were acquired by 
New York City immediately prior to the lines being transferred to MABSTOA. MABSTOA 
is a subsidiary of NYCTA and maintains bus facilities in Manhattan and the Bronx.4 
Although separate iegai entities, both are managed, supervised and administered under 
the same organizational structure. For example, the NYCTA Vice President for Labor 
4
 Public Authorities Law §§1203-a(1) and (2). 
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Relations is responsible for all labor relations at NYCTA and MABSTOA, as well as 
other related entities in New York City providing public transportation. 
TSO is the collective bargaining representative for a supervisory unit of 
MABSTOA employees that includes seven employees holding the TPPS title. 
TSO and MABSTOA are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that 
contains the following management rights clause: 
Without limitation upon the exercise of any of its statutory 
powers or responsibilities, the Operating Authority shall have 
the unquestioned right to exercise all normally accepted 
management prerogatives, including the right to fix operating 
and personnel schedules, impose layoffs, determine work 
loads, arrange transfers, order new work assignments, and 
issue any other directive intended to carry out its managerial 
responsibility to operate the omnibus routes safely, 
efficiently, and economically. 
The union fully accepts the Operating Authority's basic right 
to manage the omnibus properties and exercise the 
management prerogatives stated in this Article, and in the 
law governing the Authority in a joint effort to place and keep 
the omnibus system on a safe efficient, economical 
operating basis. The Operating Authority recognizes that in 
the exercise of its rights and prerogatives to manage the 
omnibus properties, as set forth in this Article, it will preserve 
the rights of the employees and/or their representatives 
through the legal and orderly processes provided for in 
Article VI hereof. 
TSO and MABSTOA are also parties to a July 17, 2000 side letter with respect to 
the commingling of NYCTA and MABSTOA's staff at NYCTA's central maintenance 
facility in East New York, Brooklyn.5 The side letter provides, inter alia, that: 
2. The following applies to all other co-mingled facilities: 
To the extent that co-mingiing is extended into other areas, 
job locations and tours of the operation within or outside of 
the Department of Buses, where it does not already exist the 
parties agree to meet to discuss and negotiate the impact of 
5
 Joint Exhibit 1, p. 27-28. 
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such a decision. If the parties cannot agree, existing 
contractual provisions will apply to the co-mingled facility or 
work.6 
On an annual basis, each MABSTOA TPPS picks his or her respective 
preferences from six fixed tours of duty and regular days off and one floater position.7 
They do not pick their MABSTOA work location. 
The primary duty of a TPPS is the supervision of Transit Property Protection 
Agents (TPPA) in protecting transit system property under MABSTOA jurisdiction in 
Manhattan and the Bronx. As part of their supervisory duties over security for 
MABSTOA locations, TPPS's inspect TPPA assigned posts, patrol locations, check 
perimeter fences, conduct security investigations and survey and inspect security 
equipment to ensure they are functioning properly. Such supervisory duties include the 
inspection and maintenance of security cameras installed at MABSTOA locations as 
well as the downloading of video when necessary. In addition, their responsibilities and 
activities include responding to alarms, confronting unauthorized persons on NYCTA 
property and walking "along subway tracks where live (sic) third rail is present."8 Prior 
to the assignment of TPPS Palmiotti to work in the subways beginning in August 2005, 
no TPPS employed by MABSTOA had been assigned there. 
NYCTA also employs individuals in the TPPS and TPPA titles. NYCTA TPPA's 
are sometimes assigned to work at MABSTOA work locations. When they are assigned 
to a MABSTOA worksite, they are supervised by a MABSTOA TPPS. 
6
 Supra, note 5, at p. 28. 
7
 The floater was created by MABSTOA to provide a substitute TPPS in case of an 
absence. 
8
 Joint Exhibit 8, p. 2. 
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The NYCTA TPPSs are in a separate bargaining unit represented by the 
Surface Subway Supervisors Association (SSSA). NYCTA and SSSA are parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement that permits, in limited circumstances, for a TPPS 
employed by MABSTOA to perform SSSA bargaining unit work. 
Within NYCTA's Department of Subways there is a Division of Security that is 
responsible for the supervision and management of security in all NYCTA and 
MABSTOA locations. The Division of Security employs a general superintendent who is 
responsible for maintaining security at all NYCTA and MABSTOA locations and for 
maintaining a central security command center. NYCTA's general superintendent 
supervises three NYCTA field superintendents who are responsible for the supervision 
of TPPSs whether employed by NYCTA or MABSTOA. 
Beginning in August, 2005, MABSTOA assigned TPPS Palmiotti to assist in 
NYCTA's installation of a security camera system at subway locations. Palmiotti was 
chosen based on his experience with the security cameras at MABSTOA locations and 
because of his computer literacy. Paimiotti's assignment did not involve the actual 
physical installation of NYCTA's security cameras. Rather, his primary role was in 
assisting the vendor and maintenance employees in determining the best angle to 
capture surveillance images. Based on his computer knowledge, Palmiotti has also 
been assigned to work on the access control system for entry into NYCTA and 
MABSTOA's offices in Brooklyn. 
During the hearing, TSO presented undisputed testimony that it was not until a 
November 8, 2005 meeting with NYCTA's Corseiio that it obtained the information 
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regarding Palmiotti's assignment that formed the basis for the improper practice charge. 
Following the meeting and immediately prior to the filing of the initial charge, TSO and 
NYCTA exchanged letters regarding the legality and appropriateness of the unilateral 
assignment to Palmiotti. 
DISCUSSION 
Exceptions to the Dismissal Based on Res Judicata 
In its exceptions, TSO contends that the ALJ misapplied the doctrine of res 
judicata by dismissing the present charge based on the Director's deficiency dismissal 
of the earlier amended charge. TSO sets forth four bases for challenging the ALJ's 
application of res judicata: 1) the Director did not provide TSO with notice and a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the question of timeliness prior to the dismissal of the earlier 
amended charge; 2) the Director's decision did not constitute a final and binding 
decision; 3) the ALJ erred in concluding that TSO did not contest the Director's decision; 
and 4) the ALJ failed to follow an earlier ALJ decision in Hempstead Union Free School 
District™ 
In support of its argument that it had been denied a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the timeliness issue, TSO disputes the ALJ's conclusion that the Director had 
granted it an opportunity to respond to the issue. TSO cites to the fact that timeliness 
was not one of the three reasons specified in the Director's January 25, 2006 deficiency 
notice regarding the initial charge. 
TSO claims that its March 1, 2006 cover letter to the Director along with the 
Director's processing of the new charge demonstrate that the Director's dismissal of the 
9
 One week or two before, TSO had received some general information that Palmiotti 
had received an assignment. 
10
 34 PERB H4530(2001). 
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the earlier amended charge was not final and binding. In the letter, TSO stated that if 
the Director did not process the charge, TSO was prepared to file exceptions to the 
dismissal of the earlier amended charge.11 
In opposition to the exceptions, MABSTOA argues that TSO had a full and fair 
opportunity to contest the Director's decision by filing exceptions with the Board 
pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules. In addition, MABSTOA relies upon earlier Board 
decisions that have dismissed exceptions based on the failure of a party to serve 
exceptions in a timely manner.12 
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with TSO that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing the charge based on res judicata. 
Under appropriate circumstances, res judicata and collateral estoppel may 
constitute appropriate bases for dismissing a charge.13 Either doctrine may be applied 
to a prior quasi-judicial determination when a party has had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issues before the administrative agency and the agency utilizes procedures 
that are "substantially similar to those used in a court of law."14 The policy justifications 
11
 We agree with MABSTOA that TSO's brief makes inappropriate reference to a 
purported conversation between TSO and the Director following the dismissal of the 
amended charge. Based on the fact that this purported conversation is not a part of the 
record before us, the Board has disregarded those references. 
12
 Town/City of Poughkeepsie Water Treatment Facility, 35 PERBfl3037 (2002); State 
of New York (Office of Mental Health-South Beach Psychiatric Center), 36 PERB 1J3039 
(2003). 
13
 Local 342, Long Island Public Service Employees, 20 PERB 1J3045 (1987); County of 
Nassau v PERB, 151 AD 2d 168, 22 PERB 1J7034 (2nd Dept 1989), affd on other 
grounds, 76 NY2d 579, 23 PERB 1J7019 (1990); City of Fulton, 31 PERB p021 (1998); 
State of New York (Div of State Police) 36 PERB P048 (2003). However, §205(d)(5) of 
the Act expressly prohibits the granting of preclusive effect to determinations of fact and 
law contained in a report and recommendations of a Civil Service Law §75 hearing 
officer. 
Ryan v NY Tel Co, 62 NY2d 494, 499, 503 (1984). 
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for applying the doctrines include the need for finality in the resolution of litigated 
disputes, the avoidance of vexatious litigation and the preservation of administrative 
resources.15 Whether to apply either doctrine requires a review of the prior pleadings 
and the procedural context and record of the earlier case, along with the decision 
itself.16 
Pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director reviews newly filed charges as a 
gate-keeping administrative function to weed out facially deficient charges and thereby 
avoid the administrative burden of holding unnecessary conferences and hearings. 
Under the Rule, the Director has the authority to summarily dismiss a charge on the 
grounds that it fails to allege facts that, as a matter of law, constitute a violation under 
§209-a of the Act or fails to allege facts that would establish that the purported violation 
took place within four months prior to the filing of the charge. In essence, the initial 
processing constitutes a sua sponte regulatory demurrer to the facial allegations of a 
charge.17 
Prior to dismissing a charge, pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director has 
no obligation to issue a notice to the charging party setting forth the reasons why the 
charge is deficient. Even when a deficiency notice is sent to the charging party, the 
15
 Chen v Fischer, 6 NY3d 94,100 (2005). 
16
 In general, strict application of New York or federal civil practice precedent may be 
inappropriate due to the distinct procedures in the Rules along with the public policy 
underlying the Act. For example, in Town ofScriba, 35 PERB fl3011 (2002), the Board, 
relying on New York civil practice case law interpreting CPLR §3217(c), concluded that 
a stipulation withdrawing an improper practice charge "with prejudice" constituted a 
basis for the application of res judicata. However, the Rules do not contain a provision 
similar to CPLR §3217(c) regarding the impact of a notice, stipulation or order of 
discontinuance. 
17
 In direct contrast to the Director's ministerial function, when a charge is processed 
and assigned to an ALJ, the merits of the charge, along with defenses such as 
timeliness, are subject to adjudication pursuant to §212.4(j) of the Rules. 
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Director is not required to inform the charging party of every reason why the charge is 
deficient.18 
As a matter of practice, the Director sends a notice to a charging party setting 
forth the reason(s) for the deficiency. The notice informs the charging party that it may 
either amend the charge by a certain date, withdraw the charge or stand by its initial 
pleading. In addition, the notice warns the charging party that if it fails to respond to the 
notice the charge will be deemed withdrawn and the matter will be closed. Although the 
Director sends the respondent a copy of the notice, along with a copy of the deficient 
charge, the respondent is not obligated to respond until such time as the charge is 
processed. 
In response to a deficiency notice, a charging party has a variety of options: it 
can voluntarily withdraw the charge; ignore the notice and have the charge be deemed 
withdrawn by the Director; amend the charge with the aim of correcting the deficiencies, 
and/or have the charge be subject to the Director's summary dismissal. Although a 
charging party has the right to file exceptions to the Director's decision, nothing in 
§204.2(a) of the Rules prohibits a charging party from filing a new charge, within the 
applicable period of limitation, containing supplemental allegations sufficient to have the 
new charge processed by the Director. 
New York and federal civil practice do not include an analogous procedure 
where, upon filing, a complaint or petition can be dismissed sua sponte based on a 
review of the sufficiency of the pleading's allegations. Judicial determinations on the 
sufficiency of a complaint or whether a cause of action is barred by the statute of 
1S
 New York City Transit Auth, 20 PERB1J3057 at 3125, n. 2 (1987). See also, UUP 
(Barry), 21 PERB P025 at 3058 n. 3 (1988). 
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limitations are determined in the context of motion practice in which the parties are 
entitled to the opportunity to serve and file affidavits and exhibits.19 
As noted by the Court of Appeals in Reilly v Reid20 the rigid application of the res 
judicata doctrine can result in the deprivation of any forum to consider the merits of a 
dispute; 
These strong policy bases, however, if applied too rigidly, 
could work conceivable injustice. In properly seeking to 
deny a litigant two "days in court", courts must be careful 
not to deprive [the litigant] of one.21 
Courts will grant preclusive effect to the dismissal of a prior lawsuit based on the 
insufficiency of the pleaded allegations only if the new complaint "fails to correct the 
defect or supply the omission determined to exist in the earlier complaint."22 Only after 
the substance of a defendant's statute of limitations defense has been fully litigated will 
a judgment dismissing a claim on that ground be deemed on the merits "especially 
where the motion to dismiss the first action was treated as one for summary judgment 
on which the court considered submissions of the parties dehors the pleadings."23 
In the present case, the ALJ erred in dismissing TSO's charge based on res 
judicata. The Director's summary dismissal of TSO's earlier amended charge, 
consistent with §204.2(a) of the Rules, constituted a decision on the sufficiency of the 
19
 See, CPLR §§3211, 3212; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 12(b). 
2045NY2d24(1978). 
2145 NY2d at 28. 
i i \j I _ C J O I i T \J\JI\J v i / Q U I U I U n i / w u c m uc iinj^iiiimy \sw, \j i I N I ^_u \j\j\j, \J<3\J, I I . I 
(1980); Amsterdam Savings Bank v Marine Midland Bank, NA, 140 AD2d 781, app 
dismissed, 68 NY2d 766 (1986). 
23
 Smith v Russell Sage Coll 54 NY2d 185, 194 (1981). See also, Spindell v Brooklyn 
Jewish Hospital, 35 AD2d 962 (2d Dept 1970), affd, 29 NY2d 888 (1972). 
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amended pleading and not the merits of the timeliness issue. The application of res 
judicata was inappropriate because the present charge included an additional allegation 
that corrected the pleading deficiency found by the Director in the earlier amended 
charge: TSO became aware of the acts alleged on November 8, 2005, within four 
months of the charge.24 Neither TSO nor MABSTOA were given notice of the timeliness 
deficiency in the amended charge or provided with the opportunity to correct the defect 
or litigate the issue prior to the Director's dismissal. In contrast, the application of res 
judicata might have been appropriate if the earlier amended charge had been dismissed 
in the context of an adjudication before an ALJ, pursuant to §212.4 of the Rules, after 
the parties had the opportunity to fully litigate the issue. 
In reaching our holding, we disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that, for res 
judicata purposes, there is a distinction between a party withdrawing a charge following 
a Director's deficiency notice and the Director's summary dismissal of a charge on the 
same grounds. Although the distinction is relevant to the ability to file exceptions, it is 
not relevant to the issue of claim preclusion in the context of matters before this agency. 
In both situations, the Director is refusing to process the charge based on a facial 
deficiency of the pleading. 
We note, however, that the Director's decision was final and binding with respect 
to the sufficiency of the original amended pleading after TSO failed to file exceptions 
pursuant to §213.6 of the Rules. By making a calculated choice to file the present 
charge without filing exceptions to the earlier dismissal, TSO risked the real potential 
M
 See, Greenburgh No 11, Union Free Sch Dist, 33 PERB1J3059 (2000). See also, 
County of Onondaga, 12 PERB fl3035 (1979), confirmed sub nom. 77 AD2d 783, 13 
PERB H7011 (4th Dept 1980); West Park Union Free Sch Dist, 11 PERB 1J3016 (1978); 
Board of Fire Commrs, Brighton Fire Dist, 10 PERB 1J3091 (1977); Captain's 
Endowment Assn, 10 PERB 1J3034 (1977). 
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that the Director's earlier decision would be given preclusive effect if the present charge 
was not processed because it, too, was deficient. But here, TSO filed a timely new 
charge correcting the deficiency found by the Director in the earlier amended charge, so 
that the application of res judicata was inappropriate. 
Finally, we reject MABSTOA's argument that TSO had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the timeliness issue by filing exceptions to the dismissal of the earlier 
amended charge. The fact that TSO had the right to file exceptions does not mean that 
it had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of timeliness. The Board's review of 
the summary dismissal would have been focused on and limited to the Director's 
construction of the original amended pleading and his application of the timeliness 
limitation to the facts pled. 
Exceptions to the Dismissal on the Merits 
in its exceptions to the ALJ's alternative merit-based rationale for dismissing the 
charge, TSO contends that as a matter of law under the Act, MABSTOA cannot 
unilaterally assign an employee to work at a NYCTA facility because MABSTOA and 
NYCTA are separate legal entities. It also claims that the ALJ erred in concluding that 
the at-issue duties assigned to Palmiotti are an inherent part of his TPPS duties. Finally, 
TSO asserts the ALJ erred in concluding that the management rights clause constitutes 
a waiver of MABSTOA's duty to negotiate the assignment of Palmiotti. 
While we agree with TSO's argument that the parties' management rights clause 
does not constitute a waiver of the duty to bargain the issue raised in the charge, we 
/ ^ 
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affirm the ALJ's conclusion that MABSTOA did not have a legal obligation under the Act 
to bargain the assignment.25 
The express terms of the management rights clause grants MABSTOA the 
prerogative to "arrange transfers" and "order new work assignments" in carrying out "its 
managerial responsibility to operate the omnibus routes safely, efficiently, and 
economically." (emphasis added) Based on the specific language utilized in the contract 
clause, we are not persuaded that the management rights clause constitutes a clear 
and unambiguous grant of right to MABSOTA to assign an employee to duties unrelated 
and outside the operation of the omnibus routes.26 
Although the negotiated agreement is not a waiver, we concur with the ALJ that 
MABSTOA did not have a duty to bargain the at-issue assignment under the Act. In 
general, the location(s) where an employer assigns an employee to perform his or her 
work duties is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining.27 The mere act of assigning an 
employee to perform duties at another employer's work location does not alter the 
employer-employee relationship.28 
25
 Rather than constituting a waiver, the management rights clause, along with the July 
17, 2000 side letter, can be construed as constituting a colorable claim of contractual 
right thereby constituting a ground for conditional dismissal. New York City Transit Auth 
(Bordansky), 4 PERB 1J3031 (1971). 
oee, Kjuuiny ui uiviiiyniuu, t.0 r c r \ D IJOU/H \ WZJO), \juumy ui Miitfyany, oo r c r \ D 
113019(2000). 
27
 Orange County Comm Coll and County of Orange, 9 PERB 1J3068 (1976). 
28
 See, Dutchess Comm Poll, 17 PERB 1J3010 (1984). 
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As the ALJ correctly concluded, the separate legal status of MABSTOA and 
NYCTA, including MABSTOA constituting a separate employer under the Act, is not a 
perse basis for concluding that the unilateral assignment of Palmiotti violated the Act.29 
TSO's reliance on the decision in Romaine v New York City Transit Authority30 is 
misplaced. In that Article 78 proceeding commenced against NYCTA only, the 
Appellate Division, Second Department, issued an order that prohibited NYCTA from 
mandating that TSO members employed by MABSTOA attend and participate in certain 
safety training. The Appellate Division did not determine any legal issues between TSO 
and MABSTOA under the Act. Contrary to TSO's argument, the fact that NYCTA is 
prohibited from issuing a mandate to a MABSTOA employee does not mean that 
MABSTOA cannot unilaterally assign the employee under the Act. 
The record does not include any evidence demonstrating that MABSTOA's 
assignment of Palmiotti to perform duties in the subways altered his terms and 
conditions of employment. Palmiotti remains a MABSTOA employee subject to the 
negotiated agreements between TSO and MABSTOA. He remains subject to the same 
supervisory structure when working at MABSTOA work location. 
The ALJ's conclusion that MABSTOA TPPSs already perform security functions 
at both MABASTOA and NYCTA work locations is based on a credibility determination 
regarding the testimony of NYCTA's Vice President of Labor Relations. TSO has not 
^ Public Authorities Law §§1203-a(1) and (2); Collins v Manhattan and Bronx Surface 
Transit Operating Auth, 62 NY2d 361 (1984); Rosas v Manhattan and Bronx Surface 
Transit Operating Auth 109 AD2d 647 (1s t Dept 1985); Reis v Manhattan and Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Auth, 161 AD2d 288 (1s t Dept 1990); Romaine v New York 
City Transit Auth, 34 AD3d 486 (2d Dept 2006); MABSTOA, 10 PERB 1J3094 (1977). 
Supra, note 29. 
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filed an exception to the ALJ's credibility finding and, therefore, the issue is waived.31 
Even if TSO had not waived the issue, the record fully supports the ALJ's creditability 
determination. MABSTOA's notice of examination expressly states that the duties and 
responsibilities of the position include responsibilities related to the security of NYCTA 
property including the subways. 
We also concur with the ALJ's finding that the duties assigned to Palmiotti are 
not outside the inherent duties of a MABSTOA TPPS. As noted, the notice of 
examination for the position states that the position is responsible for maintaining 
security at NYCTA work locations. Second, the record establishes that the duties of a 
MABSTOA TPPS include the inspection and maintenance of security cameras. 
Finally, we reject TSO's argument that MABSTOA's negotiation proposal to expand the 
scope and nature of the current commingling of MABSTOA and NYCTA employees at 
MABSTOA worksites establishes that MABSTOA had a duty to negotiate Palmiotti's assignment 
to a NYCTA worksite. The proposal is indicative of MABSTOA's willingness to negotiate but is 
not probative as to whether such willingness was related to any such legal duty. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant TSO's exceptions, in part, but in all other 
respects affirm the decision and order of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York /) ^^ 
!_.,_._, i _ n . _ / / . : / _ / - M \J-/ \^z:. jerume miKuwiiz, L/ficurman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
31
 Rules §213.2(b); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB P008 (2007). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27238 
- and -
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK AND SUFFOLK 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (BARRY J. PEEK, of counsel), 
for the Charging Party 
LAMB & BARNOSKY, LLP (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN AND LINDSAY 
T. CROCKER, of counsel) for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Suffolk County Correction 
Officers Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing an improper practice charge, as amended, alleging that the County of Suffolk 
and Suffolk County Sheriff (Joint Employer) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting a sick leave demand, that included a 
Sick Leave Management Program (SLMP) proposal, in its petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration. The improper practice charge alleged, inter alia, that §209.4(h) of the Act 
forecloses the submission of the SLMP proposal to interest arbitration. The Joint 
Employer filed an answer denying that the proposal is precluded from submission to 
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interest arbitration pursuant to §209.4(h) of the Act and raising various affirmative 
defenses.1 
Following the parties' submission of a stipulation of facts and record in lieu of a 
hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the Association's charge, concluding that 
the SLMP proposal is not precluded from submission to interest arbitration because it 
does not raise "issues relating to disciplinary procedures and investigations", as that 
phrase is utilized in §209.4(h) of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that the ALJ misconstrued the relevant 
facts and misinterpreted the applicable law in concluding that the SLMP proposal is not 
precluded from submission to interest arbitration pursuant to §209.4(h) of the Act. 
Specifically, the Association contends that the SLMP proposal permits the Joint Employer 
to impose penalties and restrictions that are disciplinary in nature on employees deemed 
sick leave abusers and chronic sick leave abusers without following the negotiated 
disciplinary procedures contained in the parties' agreement.2 The Joint Employer 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
1
 The Joint Employer filed a separate improper practice charge, Case No. U-27251, 
challenging various Association proposals included in the Association's cross-petition 
for interest arbitration. Pursuant to a stipulation of settlement, the Association and the 
Joint Employer resolved all the issues that were raised in the two improper practice 
charges with the exception of whether the SLMP proposal was properly submitted to 
interest arbitration. 
2
 Before the ALJ, the parties agreed that the SLMP proposal does not relate to 
"eligibility and assignment to details and positions" under §209.4(h) of the Act. 
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FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions.3 
The Association represents a bargaining unit comprised of various Correction 
Officer and Warden titles in the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department. The Joint 
Employer and the Association are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement for the 
period January 1, 1997-December 31, 1999 and a stipulation, dated December 4, 2001, 
that extended the agreement as modified. 
Pursuant to Section 15 of the collectively negotiated agreement, all permanent 
full-time employees in the bargaining unit are entitled to: 
the Progressive Discipline Systems, and changes 
thereto, as developed and directed by the Office of 
Personnel and Labor Relations. The parties agree to 
meet and confer within ninety (90) days of the final 
ratification of this agreement to clarify Section 15 as it 
applies to the Progressive Disciplinary Procedure. If 
the parties fail to agree, a mutually agreed upon third 
party neutral shall decide the issue. However, under 
no circumstances will a full time, permanent employee 
be terminated for disciplinary reasons, unless he/she 
is given the opportunity of a Section 75 Hearing.4 
Under the negotiated provision, the Association can elect to proceed to 
arbitration in lieu of a Civil Service Law §75 hearing in cases when the Joint Employer is 
seeking termination as the penalty. When the Joint Employer seeks a penalty "less than 
termination", the provision provides that a Civil Service Law §75 hearing will be held. 
The parties are at an impasse in their negotiations for a successor agreement 
and an October 6, 2006 mediation session was unsuccessful. 
3
 40 PERB H4570 (2007). 
4
 The stipulation of facts and record does not contain the Progressive Disciplinary 
Procedure referred to in Section 15 of the agreement. 
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On or about November 9, 2006, the Joint Employer filed and served a timely 
petition for compulsory interest arbitration. The Association filed and served a timely 
cross-petition for interest arbitration, dated November 22, 2006. 
The Joint Employer's petition for compulsory interest arbitration contains its 
various negotiation demands including a demand seeking to amend Section 8.7 of the 
parties' agreement relating to sick leave. Under the sick leave demand, the Joint 
Employer proposes the SLMP which it attached as a separate document. 
In the definitional section of the SLMP proposal, the Joint Employer defines the 
criteria to be used in designating bargaining unit members as sick leave abusers or 
chronic sick leave abusers. A sick leave abuser is defined as an employee "who has 5 
or more occurrences of sick leave, or 8 or more tours of sick leave, during any 12 month 
period." A chronic sick leave abuser is defined as a bargaining unit member who has: 
(a) been a sick leave abuser for 18 consecutive months; or (b) had 10 or more 
occurrences of sick leave, or 16 or more tours of sick leave during any 12 month period. 
The SLMP proposal sets forth, in the rules and restrictions sections, various 
specific employment consequences when a correction officer utilizes sick leave or when 
the Joint Employer designates an employee as a sick leave abuser or a chronic sick leave 
abuser: 
C.3. Correction officers who have returned to duty 
from any sick leave will not work scheduled overtime 
during the 7 days immediately following their return to 
duty, unless ordered by a Supervisor to do so. 
r\ A <-> j.: r\tc. , . . . 1 J : „4. 1 » u i # 
w . t . oui ieCuun vjinueiS wnu t t ie ueaiyiicueu sior\ 
leave abusers or chronic sick leave abusers will not: 
a. work scheduled overtime, unless ordered by a 
Supervisor to do so, 
b. switch a tour of duty, 
c. apply for preferred assignments or designations, 
d. pick new tour schedule if an opening occurs. 
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D.1. Correction Officers designated as sick leave 
abusers are restricted as follows: 
a. will not receive night differential pay while on sick 
leave, and 
b. restrictions cited in rule #4 
D.2. Correction Officers designated as chronic sick 
leave abusers are restricted as follows: 
a. will not receive differential pay while on vacation; and 
b. subject to the same restrictions as a sick leave 
abuser. 
In the duties section, the Joint Employer sets forth the enforcement procedures 
of the policy. Under the proposal, the Commanding Officer of the Joint Employer's 
Medical Evaluation Section is responsible for monitoring and administrating the program 
including: (a) designating sick leave abusers and chronic sick leave abusers; (b) issuing 
written notification of the designation together with the applicable rights and restrictions; 
(c) issuing final determinations from appeals challenging the designation; and (d) 
removing the designation and issuing a written notification of the removal. 
DISCUSSION 
The Association's exceptions presents the Board with its first opportunity to 
determine the scope of the exclusions from interest arbitration contained in §209.4(h) of 
the Act. 
In 2005, Suffolk County correction officers were added to the class of public 
employees, under §§209.2 and 209.4 of the Act, who are entitled to interest arbitration to 
render a determination resolving an impasse in collective negotiations.5 At the same time 
the Legislature added a new subsection (h) to §209.4 of the Act containing an explicit 
5
 L 2005, c737, §3. 
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statutory exclusion of certain subjects from interest arbitration involving Suffolk County 
) 
correction officers.6 Section §209.4(h) of the Act states: 
With regard to Suffolk county correction officers the 
provisions of this section shall not apply to issues relating to 
disciplinary procedures and investigations or eligibility and 
assignment of details and positions, which shall be governed 
by other provisions prescribed by the law. (Emphasis 
added) 
The exclusions contained in §209.4(h) of the Act are the same as those 
applicable to employees of the state police set forth in §209.4(e) of the Act. 
In its exceptions, the Association contends the SLMP proposal is not arbitrable 
because the proposal contains adverse consequences arid procedures for correction officers 
who use sick time and who are designated as sick leave abusers and chronic sick leave 
abusers. The consequences in the proposal are denial of overtime, night differential pay and 
) the opportunity to switch a tour of duty or pick a new tour, all of which are contractual 
benefits. According to the Association, these adverse consequences constitute issues 
"relating to disciplinary procedures and investigations" as that phrase is utilized in §209.4(h) 
of the Act. We agree. 
In construing the meaning of the exclusionary phrase "relating to disciplinary 
procedures and investigations" in §209.4(h) of the Act, it is appropriate to examine the 
use of the phrase "relating to" in other subsections of §209.4 of the Act.7 
Most relevant to our analysis are §§209.4(e), (f) and (g) of the Act which grant 
compulsory interest arbitration to certain state police employees, state correction 
6
 L 2005, c 737, §4. 
7
 McKinney's, Statutes §97; New York State Police Investigators Assn, 30 PERB1J3013 
) at 3027 (1997), confirmed sub nom. New York State Police Investigators Assn v New 
York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 30 PERB fl7011 (Sup Ct Albany County 1997). 
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officers and certain deputy sheriffs. At the time the 2005 bill regarding Suffolk County 
correction officers was introduced, the Senate sponsor made explicit reference to prior 
amendments to §209.4 granting compulsory interest arbitration to state police officers, 
state correction officers and deputy sheriffs.8 
In New York State Police Association,9 the Board analyzed the significance of the 
Legislature's use of the qualifying term "directly" to the phrase "relating to compensation" 
in §209.4(e) of the Act and concluded that the Legislature intended for the phrase to be 
narrowly construed to apply to only those issues where the sole, predominant or primary 
characteristic of the proposal seeks to effect a change in the amount or level of 
compensation. At the time, §209.4(e) of the Act provided: 
With regard to members of any organized unit of 
investigators, senior investigators and investigator 
specialists of the division of state police, the 
provisions of this section shall only apply to the terms 
of collective bargaining agreements directly relating to 
compensation, including but not limited to, salary, 
stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits; and shall not apply to non-
compensatory issues including, but not limited to, job 
security, disciplinary procedures and actions, 
deployment or scheduling, or issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation which shall be 
governed by other provisions proscribed [sic] by law. 
(Emphasis added) 
Following the Board's decision, the Legislature in 2002 amended §209.4(e) of the 
Act to provide: 
With regard to members of any organized unit of 
troopers, investigators, senior investigators, 
8
 Sponsor's Memo, Bill Jacket, L 2005, c 737; L1995, c 432 and 437; L 2001, c 586; 
L 2003, c 696. As noted, the subject matter exclusions for employees of the state police 
in §209.4(e) of the Act are identical to those set forth in §209.4(h). 
9
 Supra, note 7. 
Case No. U-27238 -8-
investigator specialists and commissioned or non-
commissioned officers of the division of state police, 
the provisions of this section shall not apply to issues 
relating to disciplinary procedures and investigations 
or eligibility and assignment to details and positions, 
which shall be governed by other provisions 
prescribed by law. (Emphasis added) 
In amending §209.4(e) in 2002 and enacting §209.4(h) in 2005, the Legislature 
did not utilize the term "directly" as a qualifier to the phrase "relating to disciplinary 
procedures and investigations." 
In contrast, when the Legislature enacted §§209.4(f) and (g) of the Act that set 
forth the issues that can be subject to interest arbitration for state correction officers and 
deputy sheriffs, the Legislature utilized the language contained in the former §209.4(e) 
including the phrase "directly relating to compensation": 
...the provisions of this section shall only apply to the 
terms of collective bargaining agreements directly 
relating to compensation, including but not limited to, 
salary, stipends, location pay, insurance, medical and 
hospitalization benefits; and shall not apply to non-
compensatory issues including, but not limited to, job 
security, disciplinary procedures and actions, 
deployment or scheduling or issues relating to 
eligibility for overtime compensation which shall be 
governed by other provisions proscribed by law. 
Following the decision in New York State Police Association™ we have held that 
the use of the term "directly" in §209.4(g) of the Act also demonstrates a legislative 
intent to narrow the range of arbitrable compensatory issues for deputy sheriffs to those 
Supra, note 7. 
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where the sole, predominant or primary characteristic of the proposal seeks a change in 
the amount or level of compensation.11 
Based on the absence of the term "directly" in §209.4(h) of the Act, we conclude 
that the plain meaning of the phrase "relating to disciplinary procedures" must be read 
broadly and that the natural and most obvious construction of the phrase includes 
proposals that seek to impose administrative sanctions for sick leave abuse.12 
In City of New York,™ the Board recently held that a proposal seeking to place 
limits on the standards that an employer may apply in defining sick leave abuse is a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining. In reaching that conclusion, we relied upon 
Poughkeepsie City School District,™ where the Board found that an employer's policy 
announcement setting forth the criteria for sick leave abuse did not alter any terms and 
conditions of employment and, therefore, was nonmandatory. In contrast, policies 
containing a nondiscretionary, progressive disciplinary system or the imposition of 
automatic disciplinary penalties have been found to constitute a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.15 
11
 Sullivan County PBA, Inc., 39 PERB1J3034 at 3111(2006); Putnam County Sheriff's 
Dept PBA, Inc., 38 PERB1J3031 (2005); Ulster County Deputy Sheriff's PBA, Inc., 38 
PERB 1J3033 (2005). 
12
 Gailband v Christian, 56 NY2d 890 (1982); Santarella v New York City Dept of Corr, 
77AD2d 844 (1st Dept 1980), revd, 53 NY2d 948 (1981); Frew Run Gravel Products, 
Inc., v Town of Carroll, 71 NY2d 126, 131 (1987). 
13 A r\ n r n n f r o n ^ - 7 m n n - 7 \ 
*tu rc r \D ]jou i / (^uu/). 
14
 19 PERB P046 (1986). 
^County of Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3074 (1998); State of New York (OMH), 31 PERB 
1J3051 (1998). 
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In the present case, we disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that the adverse 
sanctions, set forth in the SLMP proposal, for the mere use of sick leave by correction 
officers and for those correction officers designated as a sick leave abuser, do not relate to 
"disciplinary procedures". In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ distinguished the proposed 
penalties in the SLMP proposal from the alternative disciplinary penalties provided in Civil 
Service Law §75(3): reprimand, a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars, suspension 
without pay or termination. While it is true that under Civil Service Law §75 the appointing 
authority is limited to a choice of four alternative penalties, it is equally true that under the 
Act, parties may negotiate alternative disciplinary procedures to replace the provisions of 
Civil Service Law §75.16 For example, in the present case, the parties have negotiated a 
disciplinary procedure in Section 15 of the collectively negotiated agreement that includes a 
progressive disciplinary system. Additionally, the courts in New York have recognized that 
the loss of contractual benefits can constitute a disciplinary penalty.17 
Furthermore, the SLMP proposal is not limited to identifying the criteria that the Joint 
Employer will utilize to designate a sick leave abuser but rather contains explicit automatic 
penalties for being so designated.18 In essence, the designation of being an abuser would 
16
 Matteson v City of Oswego, 186 AD2d 1017 (4th Dept 1992); Brabham v Weinstein, 
89 AD2d 566 (2d Dept 1982); Auburn Police Local 195, 10 PERB P045, mot denied, 
10 PERB 1J3060 (1977), revd, Auburn Police Local 195vHelsby, 91 Misc2d 909, 10 
PERB 1J7016 (Sup Ct Albany County 1977), affd, 62 AD2d 12, 11 PERB 1J7003, (3d 
Dept 1978), affd, 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB 1J7006 (1979). 
17
 New York State Inspection, Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Department of Correctional Services of the State of 
New York, 210 AD2d 859 (3d Dept 1994), mot iv den, 85 NY2d 807 (1995); Cohen v. 
McGuire, 94 AD2d 664 (1s t Dept 1983). 
18
 It is unquestionable that if the SLMP proposal was limited to setting forth the 
applicable criteria, it would be nonmandatory under Poughkeepsie City School District, 
supra, note 14. 
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place a correction officer into a penalty box mandating the denial of night differentials, 
establishing limitations on overtime entitlement and creating restrictions relating to 
schedules and tours all of which constitute limitations on contractual benefits. In addition, it 
would penalize other correction officers for using sick leave by denying them a contractual 
right to work overtime for a full week. 
The SLMP proposal implicates both sick leave, a subject of arbitration pursuant to 
§209.4(h) of the Act and disciplinary procedures, a subject which is precluded from 
arbitration by that provision. Applying a balancing test, we conclude that, on the specific 
facts before us, the disciplinary aspect of the proposal predominates. By including penalties 
impacting terms and conditions of employment for the mere use of sick leave, the SLMP 
proposal transforms sick leave use into a form of misconduct. 
Therefore, we conclude that because SLMP proposes to impose penalties for the use 
of sick leave, it relates to disciplinary procedures and is, therefore, excluded from interest 
arbitration under §209.4 (h) of the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the Association's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. We, therefore, find that the Joint Employer has violated §209-a.1 (d) 
of the Act by submitting a prohibited demand to interest arbitration. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Joint Employer shall withdraw the 
SLMP proposal from interest arbitration. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York 
RoBert S. Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER CASE NO. S-0037 
for a determination pursuant to CSL §212. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 5, 2007, the Westchester County Board of Legislators adopted 
Resolution No. 193-2007 (as amended) authorizing the termination of the Westchester 
County Public Employment Relations Board as established by Act No. 84-1967, as 
amended by Act No. 1-1968, and subsequently amended by Acts Nos. 65-1969 and 
108-1970. Pursuant to the most recent resolution, all local provisions and procedures 
relating to the Westchester County Public Employment Relations Board were abolished. 
The County has published a notice of termination in County office buildings and in a 
newspaper of general circulation. 
We find that the County of Westchester has fully complied with §203.6 of our 
Rules of Procedure to terminate a local public employment relations board and, 
therefore, we determine that our February 14, 1968 Order1 approving the establishment 
of the local public employment relations board should be rescinded. 
J 
1
 County of Westchester, 1 PERB H 350 (1968). 
S-0037 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the order of this Board, dated February 
14, 1968, approving the resolution establishing the Westchester County Public 
Employment Relations Board be, and the same hereby is, rescinded, effective 
December 4, 2007.2 
WE FURTHER ORDER that all matters pending before the Westchester County 
Public Employment Relations Board as of December 4, 2007, be forwarded to PERB for 
further processing. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York 
// Jerome LefkowjJz, Chain™ / / 
JbkzJ ^. 
Robert S. Kite, Member 
2
 As relevant here, §203.6 of PERB's Rules of Procedure, specifies that the effective 
date of a termination of a local public employment relations board shall not take effect 
until 60 days after PERB receives a certified copy of the local resolution to terminate the 
local board. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5675 
VILLAGE OF HOMER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 317, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
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representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time Motor Equipment Operators in the highway, water and 
sewer departments. 
Excluded: All elected officials, office clerical and seasonal employees and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Local 317, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York 
yC^fTn^L^-
Jerome Lefk^witz, Chairman 
y * /? 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
1 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5714 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN AND SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
FRANKLIN COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
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public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Cook, Cook Manager, Account Clerk/Civil Deputy, Correction 
Officer, Deputy Sheriff/Correction Officer, Senior Account Clerk, 
Correction Officer Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff/Correction Officer 
Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff/Civil Officer, Senior Account Clerk/Civil 
Deputy. 
Excluded: .Sheriff, Undersheriff, Principal Account Clerk/Typist, Correctional 
Facility Nurse, Warden. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York 
JZ. 
y Jerome Lafkowitz, Chairman 
/ y%£-
Robert S. Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MALVERNE SECURITY ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5721 
MALVERNE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Malverne Security Association, NYSUT, 
AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and part-time security personnel. 
Excluded: Administrators, supervisors and all other employees of the District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Malverne Security Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-
CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York 
^AjfWS^ 
(Jerome Lefkowjt'Z, Chairman 
i/ 
v 'JUc RobertlTHite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH BUFFALO CHARTER SCHOOL INSTRUCTIONAL 
STAFF ASSOCIATION/NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5729 
SOUTH BUFFALO CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the South Buffalo Charter School Instructional 
Staff Association/NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the empioyees of the above-named pubiic employer, in the unit agreed upon 
by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5729 -2 
Included: All Teachers, Teaching Assistants, Library Assistants, Reading 
Coaches, Counselors, Social Workers, Nurses, Mentors, 
Technology Coordinators and regular building Substitute Teachers 
employed by the South Buffalo Charter School. 
Excluded: All supervisors, managerial and confidential employees, 
administrators, business office staff, clerical employees, per diem 
substitute teachers, security employees and maintenance 
employees employed by the South Buffalo Charter School. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the South Buffalo Charter School Instructional Staff 
Association/NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefko^ftz, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ITHACA SUBSTITUTES ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5730 
ITHACA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ithaca Substitutes Association, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5730 -2 
Included: All per diem substitute teachers with a current letter of reasonable 
assurance of continued employed. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Ithaca Substitutes Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 5, 2007 
Albany, New York 
</ sQl&VMsC.^ 
Jerome Lefk$witz, Cfhgffrman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
